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This study reports findings of a comparative study of the influence of firm performance on executive compensation in
Australia  and Canada. The key finding of the study is that revenue growth rather than profit growth is one of the key
determin ants of exe cutive com pensatio n. 
INTRODUCTION
Researchers have examined the determinants of executive compen sation in spec ific reference to firm performance
(Simon, 1957; McGuire, Chin and Elbing, 1962; Baumol, 1967; Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Jensen and  Murphy, 1990a,
1990b; Miller, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998). However, much of the empirical literature on executive compensation
is largely based  on data fro m the Unite d States. O nly recently has the re been so me researc h interest in exec utive
compensation in other countries such as Britain, Canada, and France (P ennings, 19 93;  Magnan, St-Onge, and Thorne,
1995; Conyon, 1 995; B arkema an d Gom ez-Meija , 1998). T here is, in fact, a de arth of literature on comparative studies
of executive compensation. In an effort to begin to fill this gap in the literature, the objec tive of this paper is to report
findings of a study examining the effects of firm p erformanc e on cash c ompen sation of cor porate ex ecutives in Au stralia
and Canada.
The paper is organized into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the literature on executive
compe nsation and , in the proce ss, identifies four influe ntial variables: co rporate  size, firm performance, industry, and
human capital attributes. The second and main section presents some preliminary results of survey data on executive
compensation practices in large Austra lian and Ca nadian co mpanies. It ar ticulates hypoth eses, postula tes a simple
empirical model, and reports and discusses the findings. The conclusions in section three shed light on the implications
of this study for future research into executive compensation.
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Many empirical studies of executive compensation have been motivated by theories of firms. In the crudest form
of the neoclassical economic theory, the primary objective of a firm is to pursue an economic goal of maximizing profits.
This, in turn, will maximize gains for owners or shareholders of the firm. However, with separation of control and
ownership, managers or executives are given power to manage the firm. And this makes it feasible for managers to pursue
their self-interest rather than the owners’ or shareholders’ economic interest in maximizing profits. Since goals of
shareholders (principal) and manager (agent) are not congruent, managers may engage them selves in opp ortunistic
behaviour for maximiz ing their perso nal gains at the co st of the princip al. This is the clas sical agency pro blem. Only
above normal compensation can dissuade managers from pursuing opportunism. This then gives rise to various forms
of incentive compensation. Consequently, executive compensation is constituted of three key compo nents:  cash
compensation, typically consisting of a salary and bonus; a variety of perquisites and supplementary benefits such as
insurance, club memberships, and other noncash rewards; and long-term incentives, which may include various forms
of stock options and deferred compensation (O’Reilly III, Main and Crystal, 1988; Stroh, 1996; Ofek and Yermack,
2000) .  
The perquisites an d supplem entary bene fits tend to represent a very small fraction, whereas the long-term incentive
package may represent a significant fraction of the total compensation package . Since it is typically difficult to establish
the worth of the long-term incentive com ponent as th e future value o f stock optio ns or perfo rmance sh ares is highly
uncertain  and difficult to value at the time awarded, there is very little research on its determinants. However, the
determina nts of cash compensation have been studied by many researchers (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Barkema and
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Four c lasses of variable s have been found to be important—corporate size,  firm performance,
industry chara cteristics, and hu man cap ital attributes.  
Sales, assets, and num ber of emp loyees are typ ically the indicators of firm size. And the job of a CEO in a large
firm is more complex and has more responsibilities than in a smaller firm. Aslo, a large firm has ability to pay higher
level of compensation (Ehrenberg and Milkovich, 1988; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987). According to Simon
(1957), larger firms have more hierarchica l levels and, because  firms attempt to en sure adeq uate pay differe ntials
between h ierarchical lev els, are likely to pa y more to C EOs. 
Researchers have also attempted to explain variations in executive compensation by using the “sales maximization”
hypothesis. It states that as firms grow, owners become dispersed and have trouble monitoring management. Therefore,
executives pursue their own interests instead of trying to maximize sharehold ers’ wealth (Sc ott and T iessen, 199 5).  By
increasing sales, they achieve gre ater prestige a nd eventua lly higher compensation. However,  Lewellen and Huntsman
(1970) came to a conclusion contradicting empirical findings of the earlier researchers.  They found a statistica lly
significant positive profit-com pensation re lationship and  no relationsh ip between  sales and co mpensatio n. This
unexpected result touched off a wave of additional studies over the next several years, but no clear resolution of the
debate ha s emerged  yet.
Firm performance is another important economic determinant of executive compensation. The economic argument
here is obvious. S ince the CE O is the individ ual respon sible for the ov erall perform ance of the organization, rewards
should  be contingent on this criterion (O’Reilly III, Main, and Crystal, 1988). The empirical evidence on the link between
performance and rewards is mixed, however.  Stolley (1987), for example, has observed that when a  board evaluates a
chief executive’s performance, “there are no rights and no wrongs, only grays.”  Even more to the point, Gomez-Mejia,
Tosi,  and Hinkin (1987) have noted, “What is mo st intriguing in the literatur e investigating ex ecutive com pensation is
that, after controlling for size, researchers have not found the relationship between CEOs’ pay and performance to be
as strong or consistent as the classical economic theories would imply.”  Nevertheless, some studies do show some
correlation between changes in executive compensation and performance as indexed by measures such as earnings per
share and return on equity (Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970). Masson (1971) specified stock performa nce in add ition to
rather than in place of profit, arguing that maximization of net worth may be a performance criterion partly independent
of yearly firm profit.   Further research has indicated that stock performance is a better predictor of CEO compensation
than either sales or profit (Deckop, 1988).
Industry is the third economic variable that can be associated with CEO pay levels.  Compensation co nsultants,
for instance, have observed that there are industry-wide differences in top-management salaries (O’Reilly III, Main, and
Crystal, 1988).  Some industries have adopted conventions of paying higher or lower than others, independent of
organizational characteristics such as size or performance. However, there are few empirical studies that demo nstrate
this relationship.
A final set of economic determinants sometimes postulated to affect productivity in the job and, hence, salary are
human capital variables such as education, work experience, and tenure in the company (Hogan and McPheters, 1980).
The logic under lying human c apital consid erations and  pay levels is that ind ividuals who  have mad e persona l investments
in job-releva nt skills and experience should earn a pre mium.  Alternatively, CEOs hired  from other firms may also
command a premium  as they tend to have more on-the-job training.  Although such arguments can be applied to CEO
compensation, the empirical evidence is not strong (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987).  Neverthe less, the length
of time an individual has served as a  CEO may affect potential compensation, either through human capital factors or
ability to manage the compensation-setting process, and should be considered as an independent variable.
There are also po litical and socia l factors that influence CEO compensation. For example, Westphal and Zajac
(1994) used politica l theories to exp lain the adop tion of long-term CEO incentive plans. The number of board of
directors appointed by the CEO  may be po sitively related to the  CEO’s a bility to manipu late his or her compensation
and that of other sen ior executive s. This dep icts managers as willing to manipulate their income through p olitical means.
Sharma and Fayyaz (2000) proposed a hegemonic power hypothesis and tested against the Canadian data, where
hegemo nic power was measured by CEO share  ownership and op tions for share purchase. Th ey found a mode st positive
effect of share purchase option on CEO cash compensation. In addition, social norms (custom) have always had a
significant influence on the determinants of compensation of special groups including CEOs.  However, as stated above,
the objective o f this research is to e xamine the e ffect of firm performance on CEO co mpensation in a comparative
context. H ence socia l and politica l variables are  not conside red in this pap er. 
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND CEO COMPENSATION
Because  of a lack of co nsistency of data and measures, country-specific information was used to examine the
influence of firm performance on the growth of CEO compensation. The emp irical methods used to analyse data and
findings obtained are therefore d iscussed on a country-by-country ba sis.
Executiv e Comp ensation  in Austra lia
The analysis of the Australian executive compensation utilizes a relatively new source of executive pay information
disclosed in published Annual Reports since 1990. The main data source is the Australian Graduate School of
Management  (AGSM ) Annual R eport F iles, which contains the top 500 Australian-listed companies by market
capitalization. All companies whose 1991 and 1996  Annual Reports were on file are included in the sample with the
exception of companies do miciled outside Australia. The e xecutive compensa tion data were taken from these  reports
in the form of freq uency distribu tion disclose d within $10,000 bands for those executives earning greater than $100,000.
For these years, a total of 285 and 324 companies within the sample disclosed details of executive compensation in the
format required.  Excluded are companies that stated nil executives earned greater than $100,000, and companies
(predomina ntly Trust and No Liability Companies) that failed to disclose any pay information. Additional financial report
information was obtained for the sample companies for 1990 and 1996 from the Australian Financial Review’s
“Shareho lder” pub lication (199 2 and 19 97). 
The executive compensation companies are required to disclose is defined in the Australian Corporations Law.
It requires the inclusion of all income (that is, money, consideration or benefits), other than retirement and
superannuation benefits, in its determination. Evans and Stromback (1994) suggested the following items would be
captured: bonuses, co mmissions, sa laries, allowanc es (for exam ple, travel,  accommodation, entertainment, and so on),
automobiles,  low interest loans, subsidized housing, and private payments such as school fees. As data are only disclosed
for companies with executives earning greater than $100,000, the sample was effectively censored at the lower end.
A brief description of the dependent variable data provided below demonstrates that Australian chief executive
officers are paid co nsiderably les s than their ove rseas coun terparts. Ta ble 1 show s the total com pensation o f chief
executive officers in Australian companies in 1996 to  average ju st over $50 0,000. W hile the data sho w little change in
the upper or lower quartile range in the 1990-96 period, a greater rate of change can be seen in the lower quartile range
in this period.
Table 1
Executive Compensation in 1990 and 1996
($000s)
1996 1990
Mean Executive Salary 536.9 314.4
Sample Standard Deviation — 363.6
First Quartile 179 160
Median 356 230
Third Q uartile 1,078 330
Sample Size 324 285
Executive compensation in Australia has been influenced by general salary administration principles such as the
maintenance of internal equity, providing for an ease of compensation administration, and so on. It is suggested here that
the application of such principles may be associated with two fundamental outcomes. First, organizations are treated as
homogeneous entities within which issues of internal equity and external competitiveness are applied “across the board”.
Second, having established a set of internal relativities, jobs with approximately equal responsibilities are considered
as relatively even contributors in producing the final corpo rate result. Un der this approach, the determination of internal
relativities is the primary building block for the compensation system. If so, the standard economic hypothesis that
growth in co rporate p rofit will automa tically lead to a gr owth in CE O com pensation m ay not hold. 
Nevertheless,  a simple statistical model for estimating influences of firm performance on the growth of executive
salary is
Base salary growth = a + b1 revenue growth + b2 profit growth + e    (1)
where a is the intercep t term, b1 and b2 are coefficien ts of revenue g rowth and  profit growth  variables respectively, and
e is a standard  error term o f the equation . 
A number of regressions were run using tobit analysis to es timate the coe fficients in a censo red regress ion mod el.
The mod el with profit lagged by one and two  years produced the fo llowing results:
CEO compensation growth in 1991 =
15.536 + 0.0002 profit growth 1989 + 0.0001 profit growth 1990  (2)
(0.9) (1.2)  
R2 = .080
Adjusted R2 = .065
 F = 1.024 
n =   269
Profit  was measured by net profit  after tax and extraordinary items and t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. As it is clear
from the t-statistics for the estimate d coefficients, a  change in p rofit in the last year o r the year befo re had no  statistically
significant influence on the  growth of CEO compensation in 1990-1991. To examine whether there is any influence of
scale of operation of businesses on the growth of CEO compensation, another regression was run using sales revenue
and asset size as independ ent variables. The results are as follows:
Table 2
Regression Results for
Log of CEO Compensation, 1991
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile
Equation #3 Equation #4
Intercept 3.2088 2.6748
1n of sales revenue 1990 0.2001* 0.0653*
(13.5) (2.6)
1n of total assets 1990 0.2525* 0.1746*
(15.1) (6.4)
R2 .3789 .4531
F-statistic 183.3* 124.8*
Sample size 301  301
Notes:
Revenues, assets and compensation are calculated in thousands.
t  statistics are shown in parenthesis.
* significant at the 0.01 per cent level.  
As the t-statistics for estimate d coefficients  of the natural logarithms of sales revenue and total assets indicate, these
two variables have statistically significant influence on the natural logarithm of CEO compensation in 19 91. This
supports  the contention of Baumol (1967) that executive salaries appear to  be far mor e closely cor related with the  scale
of operatio ns of the firm than  with its profitability.
Executive Compensation in Canada
As noted above, executive compensation consists of base salary, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, and
benefits  and perquisites. Performance bonuses make up the core of short-term incentives. Commonly used measures of
performance for this purpose include return on equity, return on assets, earnings per share, operating income,
development of new products or services, and change in market share. Stock option plans and stock grant plans are the
core of long-term inc entives. Pen sion, life insurance, “golden parachute” agreements, company car, club membership s,
and liberal expense accounts constitute components of benefits and perquisites (Kanungo and Mendonca, 1997 ).
Laurent Beaudoin of Bombardier Inc. was the highest paid executive in 1996 in Canada. He received a total
compensation of $19,100,317 (nineteen million one hundred thousand three hundred seventeen dollars). However, he
was recipient of the highest compe nsation in only one comp onent – option gains.
Variability  in terms of all components of executive co mpensatio n is remarkab le. Table  3 presents the highest and
the lowest range for different components of executive compensation in leading Canadian companies in 1996.
Table 3
Executives’ Compensation in Leading Canadian Companies in 1996
(the highest and the lowest range)
Basic Salary Bonus Options Other Total
Gains Compensation
Highest 2,045,400 7,810,293 17,544,000 296,486 19,100,317
Lowest 110,000 0 0 0 712,000  
Source: John Saun ders, The Globe and Ma il (Saturday, April 1 2, 1997, pp. B6-B7).
Well,  Laurent B eaudoin re ceived $1 9,100,3 17 in 199 6. Howe ver, this figure is deceptive in that he received zero
increases in all compo nents of his com pensation p ackage b ut the option g ains. His total co mpensatio n in 1996  would
be the same as in  1995 if an  exercised o ption gain  amounting  to $17,5 44,000  is extracted. It ca n also be see n from T able
3 that the lowest amount of basic salary of a Canadian CEO was only $110,000 – still more than three times the average
earnings of average Canadian employees. However, the lowest amount of total compensation among 100 executives was
$712,000. This is an example of the complexities involved in the composition of executive compensation. In addition,
several CEOs have  unexercised option ga ins – some exe rcisable  and some not yet exercisable. For example, Peter Munk
of Barrick G old had e xercisable  option gains to the value of $60,000,000 although he d id not exerc ise these optio ns in
that year. Similarly, Francesco Bellini of BioChem Pharma and Laurent Beaudoin of Bombardier respectively had
$35,00 0,000 a nd $33 ,500,00 0 worth of e xercisable o ption gains. 
From these facts about executive compensation in Canada and the variability between the highest and the lowest
ranges for each component of the compensation, it appears difficult to establish any pattern of executive compensation
system. Bonuses and options are the key factors for this to happen. Hence we exclud e these components in our stastistical
analysis. 
The measure of executive p ay used here  is the growth  rate of basic salary of executives in 1996. The growth rates
of revenue and profit are the two indep endent var iables hypo thesized to h ave exerted  significant influence  on the grow th
of executive base salary. It is important to note that the actual measure of company performance and its specification for
statistical analysis are still subject to debate. Data required to estimate equation (1) are obtained from the report referred
to above, which was published in the Globe a nd Ma il. The pub lication has rep orted data  on absolu te dollar valu es of
various components of CEOs compensation as well as growth rates of these components. The same publication also has
data on revenu e and on p rofit. Discou nting for missing d ata, a usable sample of 72 firms was obtained for this analysis.
Estimates of equation (1) gives the follow ing results:
Base salary growth = 5.261 + 0.177** revenue growth – 0.005 profit growth  (5)
(2.603) (0.385)
R2 
= .092
Adjusted R2 = .065
 F =  3.488
n =  72
A t-test on the coefficients of revenue growth and profit growth indicates that the coefficient of revenue g rowth
is significantly different fro m zero wh ereas the co efficient of profit gro wth is not significantly  different from zero. As
there might be a high correlation between revenue growth and pro fit growth, which may lead to a problem of
multicollinearity,  two separa te regression s were run usin g only revenu e growth  or profit growth as independent variable.
Only the revenue growth eq uation yielded significant results:
Base salary growth = 5.174 + 0.170** revenue growth        (6)
(2.615)                
R2 = .0899
Adjusted R2 = .0769
F =  6.913
n = 72
Given that shareholders in today’s corporate governance system exert little influence with regard to executive
compensation determination, the traditional reasoning that executive compensation is tied to a variable in which
shareholders are interested is hardly tenable. T his may be o ne reason w hy the profit gro wth showed  no statistically
significant influence on the growth of base salary growth. In fact, in an insightful piece, Jensen and Murphy (1990b:138)
observed that “in most publicly held companies, the compensation of top executives is virtually independent of
performance.” 
The empirical findings reported here indicate  a significant influenc e of revenue  growth on th e growth  of base salary
of Australian and  Canadia n executives b ut no statistically significan t effect of profit gro wth on the growth of CEO
compensation. This is in line with  what Baumol (1967:46) has noted, “Executive salaries app ear to be far m ore closely
correlated with the scale of operations of the firm than with its profitability.” 
CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the determinants of the growth of executive compensation in Australia and Canada.
Influences of growth of company performance (measured by revenue growth and profit growth) on executive salary were
examined. The em pirical findings sh ow a statistically significa nt effect of reven ue growth  on the growth of executive
compensation. However, profit growth does not seem to have influenced the growth of CEO compensation in a
significant way, providing a limited support to the hypothesis advanced by Baumol (1967 ).
However, there are several limitation s of this study. First, there  will be some idiosyncratic country and company
characteristics in many cases which will influence executive compensation in a significant way.  This study has not
captured this effect adequa tely. Secondly, executive compensation has several components. Increasingly, more compa nies
have been rewarding their executives through use of incentive compensation such as share options. However, this study
has focussed o n cash com pensatio n and benefits only. This calls for a closer look at the determinants of different
compo nents of executive compensation. Important areas for further research therefore include a detailed cross-country
comparative analysis of the ma jor institutional ch aracteristics that im pinge upo n executive c ompen sation; a systema tic
investigation of executive compensation and its relationship to corporate size, firm performance, industry and human
capital attributes; and an examination of the long-term incentive package including various forms of stock options and
deferred c ompen sation.    
Meanwhile, a lack of robust relationship between company performance and  base salary growth o f executives in
leading companies in countries such as Australia and Canada provides sufficient justification for public discomfort about
the fact that some executives are awarded millions in salary while so many ordinary workers have problems even
obtaining a modest living wage. Th ere is neither a good theory to sup port nor a moral justification to con done these
outrageo usly high salaries fo r executives. 
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